Society for the Advancement of Philosophy
University of Zagreb – Center for Croatian Studies

INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONFERENCE

Zagreb Applied Ethics
Conference 2013

PROGRAM & BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

June 12–14, 2013

Borongaj Campus • Center for Croatian Studies
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www.upf.hr www.hrstud.unizg.hr
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Welcome Address

Dear presenting authors and members of the audience, it is our great pleasure to extend you a warm welcome to the Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference 2013. The Zagreb Applied Ethics Conference 2013 is the most recent in the series of international philosophical conferences organized by the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and the Center for Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb. Furthermore, it is the second conference devoted to applied ethics (the first one took place in 2011) and both institutions plan to continue organizing it on a biennial basis. As announced in the call for papers, one of the aims of this year’s conference is to gather philosophers and other scholars primarily, but not exclusively, from Central and Southeastern Europe who will present their papers on various topics in applied ethics, ranging from particular case studies to more general (foundational and methodological) issues. The other, no less important, aim of the conference is to promote a rational and critical approach to applied ethics that adheres to the principles of conceptual rigor, soundness of argumentation and scientific accuracy. Based on the final program, we are confident that this year’s conference will accomplish both aims. Three plenary lectures and 23 presentations by experts in ethics and applied ethics from 16 different countries (Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Croatia) will be delivered. The quality of the contributed papers also seems unquestionable – they were carefully selected from a large number of high quality submissions many of which, unfortunately, had to be rejected due to the limited time frame of the conference. In brief, we are confident that a stimulating philosophical conference with dynamic discussions is awaiting us. We hope you will enjoy it, as well as your stay in Zagreb!

Members of the Organizing Committee
Conference Program
Wednesday, 12 June 2013

09:30–09:40 Opening of the conference

Josip Talanga, Head of the Center for Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb

Davor Pecnjak, President of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy

09:40–10:40 Plenary lecture

Ingmar Persson, University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Could liberal democracy cope with climate change?

10:40–11:00 Coffee break

11:00–13:00 Session I

Igor Primorac, Professor Emeritus, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Is terrorism morally distinctive?

Uwe Steinhoff, University of Hong Kong, China
Rodin on self-defense and the “myth” of national self-defense: a refutation

Marcus Agnafors, Lund University, Sweden
The moral boundaries of money, markets and market discourse – a critique of Satz and Sandel

Tomislav Janović, University of Zagreb, Croatia
From collective behavior to complicity: the puzzle of participatory intention

13:00–14:30 Lunch break

14:30–16:00 Session II

Anthony Skelton, University of Western Ontario, Canada
Temporal neutrality, childhood and the value of a life

Darko Polšek, University of Zagreb, Croatia
“Identified vs. statistical lives”: heuristic and biased reasoning in bioethics

Friderik Klampfer, University of Maribor, Slovenia
Euthanasia, slippery slope and precautionary principle

16:00–16:30 Coffee break

16:30–18:00 Session III

Vojko Strahovnik, University of Ljubljana / University of Primorska, Slovenia
Moral theory and epistemic value and role of intuitions in applied ethics

Giuseppe Schiavone, European School of Molecular Medicine, Milano, Italy
Moderate epistocracy for deliberative bioethics

Tomislav Bracanović, University of Zagreb, Croatia
Bioethics and the two cultures
Thursday, 13 June 2013

09:30–10:30 Plenary lecture

JOHN HARRIS, University of Manchester, UK
“No thanks for the memories”. Is there a duty to bear witness?

10:30–11:00 Coffee break

11:00–12:30 Session IV

EVANGELOS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece
Cloning and the right to a unique identity

ELVIO BACCARINI, University of Rijeka, Croatia
Human cloning and autonomy

JONATHAN PUGH, University of Oxford – Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, UK
Ravines and sugar pills: defending deceptive placebo use

12:30–14:00 Lunch break

14:00–15:00 Plenary lecture

LUKAS MEYER, University of Graz, Austria
Climate justice. How historical emissions should count

15:00–15:30 Coffee break

15:30–17:00 Session VI

CÉSAR PALACIOS GONZÁLEZ, University of Manchester, UK
The ethics of the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras

DANIELA CUTAS, Maastricht University, Netherlands, Umeå University and University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Ethics and policy implications of artificially creating human gametes

LUKA VUCEMILIO, University Hospital Merkur, Zagreb, Croatia
MIKLON MILOŠEVIĆ, SANJA BABIĆ-BOSANAC, JADRANKA MUSTAJBEGOVIC, ANA BOROVEČKI, Andrija Stampar School of Public Health, University of Zagreb – School of Medicine, Zagreb, Croatia
Is there a need to improve informed consent procedures in Croatia – a pilot field survey on a representative sample, a food for thought?
Friday, 14 June 2013

09:30–11:00 Session VI

MATEJ SUŠNIK, University of Rijeka, Croatia
Does it matter who is driving the trolley?

RADIM BĚLOHRAD, Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic
Personal identity and attributability of actions

IOANA PETRE, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
Future generations and the justifiability of germline engineering

11:00–11:30 Coffee break

11:30–12:30 Session VII

MARIUSZ J. GOLECKI, University of Lodz, Poland
Synallagma and the nature of rights

PETER SYKORA, University of St. Cyril and Methodius, Trnava, Slovak Republic
The role of evolution in synthetic biology risk assessment

12:30–14:00 Lunch break

14:00–15:00 Session VIII

MIRKO DANIEL GARASIC, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia / LUISS University, Rome, Italy
From censorship to consistency: some loopholes in the Human Enhancement ideology

TVRTKO JOLIĆ, Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
Who should be morally enhanced?

15:00–15:15 Closing of the conference

17:00–18:30 Guided sightseeing of Zagreb for participants of the conference

20:30 Conference dinner
Plenary Lectures
“No thanks for the memories”. Is there a duty to bear witness?

JOHN HARRIS
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This paper will address the paradoxes of memory manipulation and discuss the question of the role of memory in personal identity, the criminal law, the possibility of history and much more.

Could liberal democracy cope with climate change?

INGMAR PERSSON
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Human psychology has been designed by evolution to enable humans to live in small-scale societies with technological means of affecting only the immediate environment. For instance, humans are most concerned about a few individuals they personally know and the imminent future, and they feel more responsible for what they cause by themselves rather than in concert with others. These features make human beings rather ill-suited to come to terms with environmental problems such as climate change which arise because they live in huge societies with millions of citizens and a sophisticated technology which allows them to exercise influence all over the world and far into the future. The political system of liberal democracy seems badly equipped to rectify this situation, since elected politicians will be reluctant to risk the goodwill of the majority by making short-term welfare cutbacks to attain long-term goals. Nonetheless, it should not be thought that human beings are biologically determined to exploit natural resources to exhaustion because more than any other animal humans also are capable of adapting their behaviour in light of their experience.
Climate justice. How historical emissions should count

LUKAS MEYER
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One of the stumbling blocks for reaching agreement on a global climate regime has been the unresolved dispute on the normative significance of historical emissions and their highly unequal effects on currently living and future people. How should historical emissions count for the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of responding to climate change among currently living people? In my presentation I will argue that they should count in three ways. First, historical emissions should count as a matter of ideal distributive justice if and insofar as their consequences can be considered beneficial to currently living and future people. Second, historical emissions have been and will be harmful to currently living and future people. It is difficult to justify compensatory measures for damages caused by historical emissions for three main reasons: the non-identity problem, past people’s limited knowledge of the long-term consequences of the emissions they caused, and the problem of attributing responsibility for past people’s actions to currently living people. Rather than regarding climate damages primarily as a reason for compensation for wrongdoing, we should view them primarily as a justification for redistribution due to undeserved benefits and harms. Third, historical emissions play an important role in forming the expectation of people in the so-called developed countries to be able to cause emissions at high, if not current levels. If we were in a position to implement a fair, effective and legitimately imposed global climate regime we should not unnecessarily frustrate that expectation.
Contributed Papers
The moral boundaries of money, markets and market discourse – a critique of Satz and Sandel

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This paper addresses the moral boundaries of money, markets, and market discourse; i.e., the question of what usage of money, what markets, and what usages of market rhetoric are morally permissible. It delivers a critique of two recent scholars having outlined such boundaries – Debra Satz and Michael Sandel – and argues that both of them fail to provide us with philosophically acceptable theories on the moral boundaries of money, markets and market discourse. Satz (2010) argues that markets are “noxious” “[…] to the extent that their operation undermines or blocks the capacity of the parties to interact as equals […]” (p. 65) However, she never engages with scenarios where the transaction of a good is conducive to equality but nevertheless firmly believed to be wrong. Moreover, Satz never explores what a society of equals would look like, and she does not provide us with a standard for weighing different forms of inequality against each other, or against competing values. Sandel (2000, 2012) has argued that inserting money into certain relations sometimes “crowd out” other important values or is conducive to social inequalities. But Sandel never presents a full-fledged theory. Rather, he challenges us to debate what values that should govern phenomena and their distribution. However, Sandel’s account needs to be supplemented to function as a theory. Moreover, if values govern the social meanings of goods, we need to account for what makes a certain value fitting to govern a certain good – a crucial question not discussed by Sandel.

Human cloning and autonomy

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Human cloning is, among else, frequently criticized as a form of enhancement that threatens the autonomy of the future being. The idea is that human cloning is a form of reproduction linked to the creation of a life with the intention of shaping that life for high achievements due to, for example, excellence in intelligence, athletic capabilities, beauty, etc. Cloning is indicated even as a new form of eugenics. In the paper I discuss cloning as a form of enhancement of the genetic inheritance of the
family. Many arguments have been directed against such a project, but in this paper I focus on the arguments that criticize cloning as a project of enhancement disrespectful of the future being as a prospective autonomous being. To the opponents of cloning who appeal to autonomy, supporters of cloning reply by saying that the value of autonomy supports cloning, but they appeal to procreative autonomy (and in my opinion to parental autonomy, as well, although it is easy to conflate the two forms of autonomy), and not to the autonomy of the future person. The question that I raise in the paper is about whether autonomy is such a fundamental value in a liberal society. I discuss the proposal which says that attributing such a strong normative role to autonomy is illiberal and that instead of this value another one must have the basic normative role – protection of conscience.

Personal identity and attributability of actions

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In the debates on the correct criterion of personal identity it is taken for granted that biological and bodily theories cannot account for the practical concerns we associate with personal identity. The argument goes as follows. Certain practical concerns, such as responsibility, presuppose the concept of identity. If identity was analyzed the way that biological and bodily theories propose, these practical concerns would not be justified. On the other hand, psychologically based theories of personal identity seem to provide the desired justification. The argument depends on the notion of attributability of actions – if a theory of personal identity is not in tune with the notion of attributability, it cannot be correct. Furthermore, attributability is claimed to be a psychological notion – the reason some actions are correctly attributable to me is that they are the product of my volitional network. In my paper I question this notion. I believe being rooted in my volitional network is not sufficient for an action to be mine. What needs to be taken into consideration is the mechanism of the production of actions as well as the content of the individual volitions. And the content of the volitions may make reference to biological and bodily states of the agent, which in turn need to be invoked in the attributability of actions, unless the volitions are delusional. As a result, attributability is arguably not a psychological notion only and, therefore, cannot be used as evidence for psychological theories of personal identity.
Bioethics and the two cultures

TOMISLAV BRACANOVIĆ
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Many bioethicists adhere to the view that bioethical decision making should involve respect for culturally diverse views on various biomedical issues. Whereas one motive for such a view is the fear of Western bioethical imperialism, the other one is the hope that culturally sensitive approach will enrich and facilitate bioethical decision making. It is argued in this paper that this culturally sensitive approach obstructs the inherently normative agenda of bioethics as it relies on allegedly unanalyzable concept of “culture” as advocated by the majority of 20th century cultural anthropologists. It is argued that its concept of culture is disconnected from both historical and biological reality and that culturally sensitive bioethics – assuming such a thing is necessary – should reorient itself towards the more flexible and down-to-earth concept of “culture” as advocated by a number of naturalistic (evolutionary and co-evolutionary) theories.

Ethics and policy implications of artificially creating human gametes

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Artificial gametes, broadly defined, are sperm and eggs derived or cultured in the lab. Ongoing research suggests that in the future it might be possible to obtain functional gametes from other types of cells (such as skin cells). Moreover, it might become possible to obtain eggs from cells from males, thus effectively turning men into genetic mothers. There are also researchers who claim that we might become able to create sperm from cells from females, thus turning women into genetic fathers. Such prospects have inspired hopes and fears of a future in which infertility no longer exists, and in which reproduction becomes more equal between the sexes; furthermore, they have inspired warnings of the end of men, or the end of women, respectively (as their contribution to reproduction may no longer be needed). During this presentation, we will look at what the research may more realistically offer, and the new challenges which it might present us with. In so doing, we will consider some of the ethical and policy implications of current research with artificial gametes.
From censorship to consistency: some loopholes in the Human Enhancement ideology

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A recent proposal in Iceland led to consider censoring pornographic websites, raising many important questions for contemporary debates in bioethics. To begin with, I will contend that such a censorship can be justified for the sake of preserving the “natural” development of sexuality in teenagers – otherwise shown to be put in danger by the over-exposition to pornographic material that youngsters have today. I take this stand as a bioconservative. Next, I will affirm that posthumanists must either agree or disagree with such a policy, and I will show that in both scenarios their overall message would come out weakened. The first option is that posthumanism accepts this censorship, agreeing with some of its arguments. Reversing Agar’s parallel between environmental and genetic enhancement, the resulting claim would be the following: if we are ready to enhance future individuals genetically, we must also be ready to do so socially, beginning with the environment in which new members of society develop. However, this acceptance would take away strength from posthumanism, as it would appear that the moral enhancement often invoked would depend on society and not the individual. The other option is to disagree. However, a liberal approach defending moral relativism would clash with other dogmas of posthumanism, such as a duty to enhance ourselves, as well as the need for our society to “morally enhance” itself. Last, I will contrast the foreseeable counterargument of using neuroenhancing drugs to “redirect” sexuality as unconvincing if nothing has been done in the first place.

Synallagma and the nature of rights

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The debate over the nature and justification of rights seems to be one of the most important features of contemporary moral and legal philosophy. The tension between two competitive explanations, namely the will theory and the interest theory occupies an important role in this debate. It seems however that the intermediary
position could be found in classical theory. Such a position could be derived from the Aristotelian concept of *synallagma* introduced in *Nicomachean Ethics*. Aristotle contemplates different justifications for remedies when some wrong has been committed by an agent, considering the nature of *synallagma* as potential justification for redress. He distinguishes between two categories of acts pertaining to the relations between agents evaluated as just or unjust: voluntary social relations (*synallagmata ecousia*) and involuntary social relations (*synallagmata acousia*). Both notions are linked to *synallagma* understood as an obligation-raising relationship of a social (inter-human) character. Thus the concept of *synallagma* plays an important role within Aristotelian ethics and may offer an interesting insight into the concept of right. In a paper the Aristotelian concept of *synallagma* is to be used as an explanation and justification for a theory of rights interpreted as complex structure consisting of four basic Hohfeldian incidents. Both Aristotle and W.N. Hohfeld consider protected goods as complex and preemptive, living space for different justification of their protection (will or interest). Thus the Aristotelian concept may be interpreted as an explanation for multifunction theory of rights, transcending the opposition between will and interest theories.

**From collective behavior to complicity: the puzzle of participatory intention**

**TOMISLAV JANOVIC**

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The crucial element distinguishing cooperative undertakings from weaker forms of collective behavior is the specific intent, shared by all participants in a joint action, to attain a common goal. It is this “participatory intention” (Kutz) that makes agents responsible – both causally and morally – for the outcome of a joint action, even if their individual contributions to this outcome are marginal or nonexistent. Bearing this in mind, it is hard to overestimate the importance of identifying participatory intentions and linking these intentions to individual acts and their consequences. An interesting instance of this problem – the problem of complicitous accountability – is revealed by the following question: How to be sure which shared intent (goal) underlies a particular instance of collective behavior, given that some instances of collective behavior are prone to very different – even equally justifiable – teleological interpretations. I will demonstrate the importance of this problem by considering some (both ethically and legally) controversial cases.
Who should be morally enhanced?

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Should we all be morally enhanced? Some propose that moral enhancement should be mandatory for all human beings. Others argue that moral enhancement should be mandatory only for certain selected groups, for instance public officeholders and violent criminals. There are several objections to both of these proposals. One objection states that if moral enhancement is to become compulsory, our autonomy and freedom would be significantly restricted. The other objection points to the possible misuse of enhancement technology. In my presentation I will firstly explore these two objections and then try to argue in favor of voluntary moral enhancement. I will also consider which motives people could have to undergo the procedure of moral enhancement.

Euthanasia, slippery slope and precautionary principle

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While (active voluntary) euthanasia is mostly criticized by appeal to deontological principles, the proposals to legalize it are very often rejected on consequentialist grounds. According to the so-called slippery slope argument, by legalizing active voluntary euthanasia we will step onto a slippery slope of ever expanding exceptions to the prohibition on deliberate killing and inevitably end up in a moral abyss of large-scale involuntary killings and widespread abuse. I begin by reviewing available data on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide as practiced in the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon. The data collected so far, I contend, fail to support the catastrophic scenarios pictured by fervent opponents of legalized euthanasia. Next I consider whether, absent compelling empirical evidence, at least a plausible causal model is being offered in support of the alarming prediction that voluntary euthanasia will increase the frequency of non-voluntary as well as involuntary forms of euthanasia. I briefly discuss, and eventually reject as hopeless, two such proposals – the lesson that we were supposed to draw from the legalization of abortion and the putatively damaging effects of (the legalization of) gay marriage on the institution of (traditional, heterosexual) marriage. I end by considering the implications of the precautionary principle for the case at hand. Isn’t the very
The possibility of large-scale abuse, as tiny as it may seem at present, sufficient to justify the status quo? Shouldn’t we err on the side of caution? Since the legalization of euthanasia would clearly advance the interests of one group of people, namely those terminally ill patients who are still capable of autonomous and rational choice of death over life, potentially at the expense of the equally vital interests of another group of people, namely those terminally ill that lack either autonomous will or the capacity to express it, we should try to calculate the size and the risk of the harm done to either party. On the assumption that being forced to live is not much less harmful than being forced to die (an assumption for which I briefly argue) and that while the first harm is immediate and real, the second is distant and merely putative, such a calculation will, I contend, also fail to justify the current legal prohibition on voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.

The ethics of the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras

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In this paper I engage with the arguments presented against the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras. I argue that the moral confusion argument presented by Robert and Baylis to prevent the development of chimeras is defective. I also claim that the human dignity argument, as provided by Karpowicz et al., and the prudential argument, presented by Streiffer and de Melo-Martín, would only prohibit the creation of chimeras on very restricted cases. Finally I show that Haber and Benham’s Genealogical Contingency Stance is inconsistent. I conclude that so far the arguments presented against the development of human-nonhuman chimeras are either flawed, contradictory, inconsistent, or they confuse the evaluation of their future wellbeing with a prohibition to create them.
**Future generations and the justifiability of germline engineering**

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The possibility of performing germline modifications on currently living individuals may target future generations’ health and the wellbeing associated to it by reducing the diversity of the human gene pool. This can have two negative repercussions: (1) reduction of heterozygosity, which is associated to a health or performance advantage; (2) uniformization of the genes involved in reproductive recombination, which may lead to the health risks involved in asexual reproduction. I argue that germline interventions aimed at modifying the genomes of future people can be neither scientifically, nor morally justifiable. This argument can be challenged by five different objections, which I intend to illustrate and refute.

**“Identified vs. statistical lives”: heuristic and biased reasoning in bioethics**

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Empirical findings in behavioral economics and bioethics both testify that we make serious errors while making decisions about saving lives. Behavioral economist Paul Slovic recently found “the more people die, the less we care” (Michel-Kerjan, Slovic 2011). Similar empirical findings were presented in bioethics as a problem of “mathematics of justice”, namely as a reasoning and decision making problem: as a bias documented while choosing between amount of care distributed to “identified lives” and “statistical lives”. We seem to be willing to distribute undue sources to save an “identified life” (the person we can relate to), and tend to neglect costs for “statistical lives” (lives of people we do not know anything about) (Hope, 2004). These two types of empirical findings have never been integrated nor perceived as having a common source. Both types of empirical results run counter, of course, to our rational expectation that the amount of care should increase with the number of people affected, but the results consistently seem to show the opposite. These biases will serve as examples of a possible disciplinary unification in the future. To behavioral economics, bioethics should provide additional documentation for
biased reasoning. To bioethics, it should serve as a means to correct known errors: as a possible “nudge” (Thaler-Sunstein) for solving distributional and other problems in medical care. We list other types of biases as valuable sources for a future cooperation.

Is terrorism morally distinctive?

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An experience of a terrorist act or campaign, and even a report on it, leaves most of us with a sense of moral atrocity. Moreover, many feel that terrorism is not only morally atrocious, but atrocious in a distinctive way – in a way different from other moral atrocities such as mass murder, ethnic cleansing, torture, or enslavement. This is not to say that they feel that terrorism is more evil than these other atrocities, but rather that it is evil in its own way. Yet the evil that is distinctive of terrorism is difficult to pinpoint. Is it the subversion of the social order that terrorists seek to achieve by their actions? Is it their lawlessness, or their rejection of morality, and indeed of all norms and values of civilization? Is it the message of extermination, expulsion, or radical subordination of entire peoples, conveyed by their actions? Or is it the fact that they intentionally kill, maim, and injure ordinary unsuspecting and defenseless citizens? In this paper I seek to identify the true locus of the distinctive evil of terrorism. I focus in particular on the claim that the deliberate killing and maiming of ordinary citizens, distinctive of terrorism, is essentially different, and much worse, than the killing and maiming of innocent civilians without intent, but with foresight (as “collateral damage”), done by soldiers pursuing legitimate military objectives.

Cloning and the right to a unique identity

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The advances in bioengineering and biotechnology seem to foreshadow the possibility of reproductive cloning for humans. This, apart from being an extremely promising prospect for genetics, is an equally challenging issue for ethics. One of the most in-
fluential arguments against reproductive cloning for human beings is that this would deprive clones of their unique identity, thus compromising one of their fundamental moral rights. In this short essay I intend to argue that the notion of the so-called right to a unique identity is neither clear nor self-evident. Furthermore, even if one takes it for granted, cloning does not seem to deprive clones of their unique identity, since, according to Leibniz’s law concerning the “identity of the indiscernibles” and McTaggart’s reverse principle concerning the “dissimilarity of the diverse”, even an exact copy of something is not identical to it. On the other hand, empirical evidence seems to imply that clones could not be identical to their prototype. Given that the clones would be spatially, temporally, environmentally, culturally and in any other way distant to their prototypes, I will conclude that the uniqueness of their identity is not compromised, therefore this argument is not morally significant.

Ravines and sugar pills: defending deceptive placebo use

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A recent survey has suggested that the use of placebos is far more widespread in UK medicine than was previously thought, once again raising questions about whether all uses of placebos are morally permissible. In this paper, I shall consider one particular issue in this debate, namely the question of whether deceptive placebo use can be morally permissible. I shall defend the view that deceptive placebo use can be morally permissible, on the grounds that the deception involved in the prescription of deceptive placebos can differ in kind to the sorts of deception that undermine personal autonomy. In order to argue this, I shall first explain the role that true beliefs play in autonomous agency, before delineating three salient ways in which an agent can be deceived into having false beliefs. I shall then argue that two of these sorts of deception are inimical to the deceived agent’s autonomy, in so far as they involve either subjugating the deceived agent’s will to another’s authority, or precluding the agent from acting effectively in pursuit of their ends. However, drawing on Berofsky “ravine” example, I shall argue that providing an agent with false beliefs is not inimical to their autonomy if the agent is only able to effectively pursue her autonomously chosen ends by virtue of holding those particular false beliefs. Finally, I shall show that deceptive placebo use need only involve this latter sort of deception.
In the recent “The Right to a Competent Electorate” (2011) Jason Brennan has presented a thought-provoking and compelling argument in favor of restrictions to the right to participation. He claimed, on harm grounds, that the “practice of unrestricted suffrage is unjust” and that incompetent and morally unreasonable people ought to be prevented from exercising their political power over others. If his argument is sound, then democratic participation needs be rethought in the light of moderate epistocratic criteria, so as to have knowledge and competence be legal requirements for the exercise of political power. Although Brennan’s articulation of the main tenets of his theory is convincing, his practical suggestion—i.e. devising voter exams that test for politico-economic knowledge—does not seem to stand the test of empirical feasibility and is also likely to lead to unwanted inclusions and exemptions. We maintain that this is so due to the all-purpose nature of the kind of knowledge and moral competence that the exams he envisages purports to make use of. We argue for issue-specific epistemic and moral tests for participation to bioethical deliberation. These tests would be required in order to grant participation to specific referenda and polls. We first explicitly ground our own version of moderate epistocracy in a republican ideal of liberty, whereby participation has no value per se. Then we list a series of theoretical and practical advantages that the sort of test we propose is likely to yield.

In The Methods of Ethics, Henry Sidgwick claims that it is self-evident that the “mere difference of priority and posteriority in time is not a reasonable ground for having more regard to the consciousness of one moment than to that of another” (ME 381). This is the axiom of temporal neutrality. This axiom expresses the idea that a value’s location in time is not normatively significant. That a benefit or bur-
den occurs in one period of life (youth) is not itself a reason to prefer it to a benefit or burden occurring in another, distinct period of life (old age). Despite the importance of this axiom to his aims in *The Methods of Ethics*, Sidgwick contributes surprisingly little to its articulation and defense. This is problematic, for like the axioms that undergird his utilitarianism, Sidgwick’s axiom of temporal neutrality is not immune from attack. Michael Slote offers one of the most formidable challenges to it, according to which the typical or characteristic successes and misfortunes of childhood do count for less in determining the value of a life as a whole when compared to the successes and misfortunes of the prime of life. In this paper, I take issue with Slote’s objection. This paper has three sections. In the first, I outline Sidgwick’s axiom and its role in practical reason. In the second, I outline Slote’s criticism. In the third, I mount a reply.

**Rodin on self-defense and the “myth” of national self-defense: a refutation**

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David Rodin denies that defensive wars against unjust aggression can be justified if the unjust aggression limits itself, for example, to the annexation of territory, the robbery of resources or the restriction of political freedom, but would endanger the lives, bodily integrity or freedom from slavery of the citizens only if the unjustly attacked state (or someone else) actually resisted the aggression. In other words, Rodin argues that a state has to surrender to an unjust invading enemy credibly saying, for instance: “Your territory, or your lives. But if you give us your territory, your lives will be spared (and you will not be mutilated or enslaved).” (Rodin calls this the “conditional threat” made by the agents of a “bloodless invasion” or “political aggression.”) I shall argue that Rodin’s position is mistaken because his analyses of necessity, the alleged duty to retreat, and proportionality in the context of self-defense are defective both from a legal and from a moral perspective. Moreover, Rodin’s opinion that we must not resist an aggressor who uses a “conditional threat” against life in order to extort from us or others the sacrifice of non-vital interests, implies nothing less than the surrender to bullies and the breakdown of law enforcement even on the domestic level. Given that on the other hand Rodin tries to justify “war as law enforcement”, this amounts to a *reductio ad absurdum* of his position.
Moral theory and epistemic value and role of intuitions in applied ethics

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The paper frames the debate on epistemic status and role of intuitions in applied ethics in a more general outline of relationship between moral theory and applied ethics. After a defense of intuitions as a way of attaining knowledge, including moral knowledge, the paper discusses several dimensions and characteristics of moral intuition, in particular its methodological, epistemic and structural aspects. In this regard moral intuitionism could be broadly understood as a position claiming that at least some of our moral beliefs can be non-inferentially justified. From the point of view of methodology the central question is what the role of moral intuitions is in moral theory and practice. Epistemological considerations focus on the epistemic status of moral intuitions. Structural aspect addresses questions regarding the level of generality of moral intuitions (general rules, middle axioms, particular cases) and their inter-connectedness. After providing answers to those questions in a form of pluralistic intuitionism the paper goes on to consider what implications this has for debates in applied ethics and discusses cases of counter-examples, thought experiments understood as intuitions pumps and moral illusions. It analyses the role that intuitions have for the method of reflective equilibrium and how this is relevant for various fields of applied ethics. How we conceive of status of moral intuition also has important consequences for the debate on moral experts and relevance of everyday moral intuitions. All those aspects discussed help us to better understand the relationship between moral theory and practice.

Does it matter who is driving the trolley?

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Contemporary defenses of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) are mainly focused on avoiding the absurdity charge raised by Judith Thomson (1991). Thomson argues that the major thesis on which the DDE is based – that intentions are relevant to moral permissibility – leads to absurd consequences and that the DDE should
therefore be abandoned. There are two strategies recently proposed in the literature for refuting Thomson’s argument. In this paper I critically examine these strategies by focusing on Philippa Foot’s version of the “trolley case” (1967).

The role of evolution in synthetic biology risk assessment

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Synthetic biology uses engineering strategies of standardization, decoupling, and abstraction to achieve predictability and reliability of a behavior of designed biology systems. The goal is to achieve by these strategies a production of interchangeable biological parts, a kind of LEGO assembly pieces (BioBricks) for synthetic biology purposes, which can be aggregated into entirely new artificial combinations never occurred in nature (“artificial life”, “Life 2.0”). Some of synthetic biology artificial systems are designed to be capable of autonomous existence and self-replication in the environment. It means that biosafety aspects of their intended or unintended release into natural environment have to be considered carefully. Specially, as synthetic biology field includes also practicing non-professionals (“do-it-yourself biology” community). A concept of biological evolution obviously does not fit into a traditional engineering paradigm. In contrast to other engineering products, artificial organisms are not like buildings, bridges, smartphones etc. They are living “machines”, so all their parts are prone to Darwinian evolution. Therefore, any predictability of their future behavior has to take into consideration possible evolutionary changes of an original design. Evolution should become another important factor in risk assessment philosophy of synthetic biology.
Is there a need to improve informed consent procedures in Croatia – a pilot field survey on a representative sample, a food for thought?

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BACKGROUND: Informed consent if obtained properly can bring additional value to physician-patient relationship and in many cases to the patient safety. The previous research done in Croatia shows the formality of the process of informed consent which often lacks quality and substances with presence of the poor knowledge of patients’ rights. Therefore the authors sought to elucidate the main issues related to the experience and assess the knowledge of general patient population (citizens of Croatia) about informed consent after several years of application of the Act on Protection of Patients’ Right. METHODS: Short survey was conducted using an independently created questionnaire on nationally representative sample, of 1023 adult subjects, divided into two groups: those who had been and had been not in hospital for treatment in the past 5 years. RESULTS: 60% of the respondents had only partial knowledge on patients’ rights. The level of knowledge about informed consent was average but not in depth. 25% of the respondents stated that they have received complete information during informed consent procedure, and graded the level of the received information as high in 9% of the cases. 15% of respondents could not remember whether they have signed informed consent form. CONCLUSION: There is a need for improvement of the informed consent procedures and for further research in the issues surrounding the practice of informed consent in Croatia especially in the areas of quality and comprehension of the information, as well as physician-patient decision-making process and education of physicians and general public.
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**Mariusz J. Golecki** (Ph.D., LL.M. Cambridge) has been educated both in Civil Law (B.C.L. 1998 University of Warsaw) and the Common Law (LL.M. 2001, University of Cambridge, Trinity College). In 2002 he joined the Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg, as a Marie Curie Research Doctoral Fellow (specialization: game theory, theory of justice). He prepared his Ph.D. dissertation on the philosophical foundations of contract law (2004). Since 2004 he holds an appointment as Associate Professor in the Department of Legal Theory and Philosophy of Law in the Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Łódź. Visiting Scholar, the Faculty of Law, University of Cambridge (2008–2009), Visiting Professor, International Christian University, Tokyo, Japan (2010) and Keio University Tokyo, Japan (2010). His research interest comprises: philosophy of law, ethics, cognitive sciences, law and economics, jurisprudence. He is a member of IVR (International Association for Legal and Social Philosophy), Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy, The UK Legal and Political Philosophy Conference, Japan Economic Policy Association. Director of the Foundation for Polish Science FOCUS research project “Linguistic categorization in law” (2010–2013). His publications include 6 books and about 40 articles.

**John Harris**, FMedSci., FRSA., B.A., D.Phil., Hon. D.Litt. Lord Alliance Professor of Bioethics and Director, Institute for Science, Ethics and Innovation, School of Law. John Harris was educated at the University of Kent and at Balliol College,
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