INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL CONFERENCE

Perspectives on Russell

PROGRAM & BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

November 24–26, 2008

Borongaj Campus • Center for Croatian Studies
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Welcome Address

On behalf of the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy and the Center for Croatian Studies of the University of Zagreb, we would like to extend a warm welcome to all of you attending the “Perspectives on Russell” Conference in Zagreb. We are happy to announce that 22 papers will be presented at the conference, by philosophers coming from Austria, China, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, United Kingdom and Croatia. It seems safe to say that the international character of this conference is obvious. What will also become obvious, as we are more than sure, is the good quality of the papers we are about to hear over the next three days. Both organizing institutions of this conference are relatively young. The Center for Croatian Studies (with the Philosophy Department as one among its eight departments) was founded in 1992, and the Society for the Advancement of Philosophy was founded in 2002, with the particular aim of promoting good philosophical work and scholarly cooperation not only within Croatia’s boundaries, but also at a more international level. This is why, in addition to the philosophical importance of the papers to be presented and subsequent discussions of them, one of the main ideas behind organizing this conference was to foster communication among scholars from different countries who share similar theoretical interests and approaches to doing philosophy. As a matter of fact, we are already convinced that this conference will be a significant step towards that goal. So, good luck with your papers and enjoy your stay in Zagreb!

Members of the Organizing Committee
Conference Program
Monday, November 24

10.00 Opening of the Conference

Chair: Tomislav Janović

10.30 Stefano Predelli, Russell’s On Denoting and the Man With the Martini
11.00 Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, The Butterfly Effect? The Reception of the Principles of Mathematics by the Pragmatist Philosophers

11.30 Coffee Break

12.00 Dušan Dožudić, Referential Descriptions: A Case against Russell
12.30 Andrew Rebera, Singular Terms and the Gray’s Elegy Argument

13.00 Lunch Break

Chair: Dušan Dožudić

15.00 Olga Markić, Russell’s Neutral Monism
15.30 Holger Leerhoff, Matter and Mind in Russell’s Neutral Monism
16.00 Mircea Cucu, Challenging Russell’s Neutral Monism
16.30 Coffee Break

17.00 Guo Peng, Referential Uncertainty of Proper Names – What Russell Tries to Say via “Socrates”
17.30 Andrei Marasoiu, Do Genuinely Proper Names Carry an Ontological Commitment?
Tuesday, November 25

Chair: Davor Pećnjak

10.00 Jiří Raclavský, Russell’s Propositional Functions Viewed as Tichý’s Constructions

10.30 Pierdaniele Giaretta, The Knowability Paradox from a Russellian Perspective

11.00 Coffee Break

11.30 Borut Cerkovnik, Conceptions of Analysis in Russell’s and Early Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

12.00 Georg Schiemer, The Early Reception of Russell’s Ramified Type Theory

12.30 Lunch Break

15.00 Guided Sightseeing of Zagreb
Wednesday, November 26

Chair: Zvonimir Čuljak

10.00 David Kovacs, Image as Datum and as Symbol in Russell’s 1921 Theory of Memory

10.30 Monica Jitareanu, Russell’s Act-Object Model of Sensation and Its Relevance for Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Perception

11.00 Arhat Virdi, The Slingshot and Russell’s Descriptions

11.30 Coffee Break

12.00 Goran Švob, Leibniz and Russell: Begriffsschrift

12.30 Sam Coleman, Russell on Matter and Mind

13.00 Lunch Break

Chair: Josip Talanga

15.00 Tadeusz Cieciernski, Russell on Indexicality

15.30 Anssi Korhonen, Russell’s Early Metaphysics of Truth, With Some Applications

16.00 Coffee Break

16.30 Ofra Rechter, Quantification Dependence and Kantian Intuition in Russell’s Principles of Mathematics

17.00 Bojan Borstner, Russell on Bundles, Particulars, and Complexes

17.30 Closing of the Conference

19.30 Farewell Banquet
Abstracts
Russell on Bundles, Particulars, and Complexes

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(1) Russell was motivated by the assumption that if someone accepts Bundle theory (BT) (s)he does not come into trouble with hidden, unknowable substratum or whatsoever, in which all qualities inhere. (1.1) The problem of Identity of Indiscernibles (II) follows analytically from BT, because it is possible to have two things made of exactly the same qualities. (2) The second point important for Russell is that for him, there is no need to introduce into the theory qualities and their instances too. In our today style: it is enough to have universals and things are made of bundles of universals; the distinction between a universal and its instance(s), usually made on the basis of abstraction (universal as the result of abstraction from its instances) is now made on the basis of the distinction between entities which can be in one place, but not more than one, at given time (bundles of universals = ordinary things), and entities which either cannot be anywhere or can be at several places at given time (Russell 1911/1956, 123–124). (2.1) Bundles of universals could (evidently) amount only to a complex universal. Therefore, an object (a thing) is nothing but a bundle of universals. How is it one and just this one (particular)? A way out could be a specific property (haecceity) possessed by each bundle and which is “responsible” for it being something particular. (3) An object (a thing) is a bundle and universals stay in a certain relation – compresence (Russell 1976, 294). Universals are capable of multiple instantiation and it is no miracle therefore that things (can) have properties in common. A momentary thing is “made of” the complex of universals, which all stand in the compresence relation. However, there are also enduring things, which are so called “four-dimensional manifold of events, with various kinds of causal relations” and they are different from each other, because there are relations “making us regard the event concerned as belonging to one piece of matter” (Russell 1948, 290). (3) If (a momentary) thing is a complex of compresent universals then all (compresent) universals are essential for (a momentary) thing. An (enduring) thing has a momentary thing as a (temporal) part at certain time (t). Does that mean that we get property/universal essentialism as the only possibility for the BT? (4) There is a hint in The Analysis of Matter (294) which has not been seen by Russell’s most severe critics, like D.M. Armstrong and N. Goodman, and which can bring us to the solution for BT.
Conceptions of Analysis in Russell’s and Early Wittgenstein’s Philosophy

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Following Beaney’s classification of philosophical analysis in Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy the paper establishes: (1) although Russell and early Wittgenstein share the starting-point of analysis that logically proper names have to have the characteristic that they never fail in reference, Russell’s analysis in On Denoting and elsewhere is typically interpretative one, meanwhile the analysis in the Tractatus (2.02–2.023) connects interpretative, decompositional and regressive aspects of analysis; (2) Russell’s conception of analysis leads to a form of actualism, which echoes in Quine’s rejections of modal concepts and in multi-actualism of David Lewis, and early Wittgenstein’s conception of analysis leads to a form of possibilism, which echoes in works of Carnap and Kripke.

Russell on Indexicality

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The topic of indexicality occupies a prominent place in Russell’s philosophy. Since the publication of The Philosophy of Logical Atomism till late works of the 40ties his opinions concerning this subject matter changed significantly: in early works Russell conceived “egocentric particulars” as indispensable logically proper names; in late essays, under the influence of Hans Reichenbach, Russell stated that indexicals “are not needed in any part of the description of the world, whether physical or psychological” (An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth). In the meantime Russell worked on different aspects of indexicality such as: (i) the role of indexicals in the construction of ideal language, (ii) their connections with the notions of acquaintance, private space and private time, (iii) psychological basis of their linguistic usage. The aim of my paper is twofold. First, I will describe the development of Russell’s views. Second, I will examine the reasons underlying: (1) Russell’s particular historical conceptions of indexicality and (2) the steps in the evolution of his thinking on the subject matter.
Russell on Matter and Mind

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Despite acknowledgement of Russell’s impact on the mind/body problem, opinion remains divided over the merits of his neutral monism and panpsychism. Moreover, neither position is taken sufficiently seriously in current debate. In this paper I examine Russell’s philosophy of mind and matter, and argue that, with his scientifically-informed panpsychism, he has bequeathed us a solution to the ancient puzzle. I compare Russell’s two theories of mind. His innovation within panpsychism was to accommodate irreducibly mental properties inside a physics-based ontological framework, making these the categorical properties of relationally-defined microphysical entities. It is this retention of irreducible mentality that constitutes panpsychism’s advantage over neutral monism. Neutral monism posits a fundamental non-mental non-physical nature in ontology. But the problems of conventional physicalism plague this theory: For, whatever the supposed categorical nature of microreality on neutral monism, it is avowedly non-mental. And yet, the powerful intuition driving anti-physicalist arguments, not to mention the appeal of panpsychism, is that mentality cannot be generated by the non-mental. Consciousness makes this vivid: consciousness’ production by the non-conscious appears unintelligible, miraculous in a way unacceptable for naturalists. As much as this is a problem for conventional physicalism, it troubles neutral monism too. Panpsychism provides a route out of this bind, hence my endorsement of it. To defend my inference to panpsychism’s truth, I consider Chalmers’ argument that it is not non-mental nature as such that is problematic for the production of consciousness, but specifically physical nature. Thus, Chalmers believes physicalism’s problems do not affect neutral monism. I argue that Chalmers is mistaken, and, therefore, that panpsychism is our proper Russellian inheritance.
Bertrand Russell was the first who adopted the name “neutral monism” in order to refer to the view committed to the thesis of the existence of a neutral stuff underlying the whole reality. One of the main rationales Russell uses in defending neutral monism is what it might be called “the intrinsic nature argument”. Russell’s “knowledge by acquaintance” is nothing but our direct way of accessing the intrinsic features of the entities. The data we acquire from our phenomenal experiences are data about the intrinsic nature of our intimate reality. Russelian monism, in its full-fledged form, is the commitment to the thesis that all entities have the same intrinsic nature in the sense that they are realized by the instantiation of some phenomenal properties. I try to argue that one may be convinced by the intrinsic nature argument that there is a basic reality, whose intrinsic properties are not accessible from the third-person perspective, and one may still hold coherently that the reality does not meet our desideratum of unification; the basic reality could still be split in two or more kinds of intrinsic entities. Finally, I intend to show that, besides difficulties one encounters in defending neutral monism, the hardest is probably to fix the content (the meaning) of “neutral”. What makes the notion of “neutral” problematic is our difficulty of conceiving something capable of constituting both phenomenal experiences (or minds or subjects) and non-sentient objects.

In “On Denoting” and subsequent writings, Russell proposed a uniform treatment of singular denoting phrases, i.e. definite descriptions, as quantified constructions. In the light of Russell–Strawson dispute over the proper treatment of descriptions, Donnellan argued that definite descriptions are ambiguous as between attributive (Russell’s) and referential use. Although such distinction is generally accepted, ever
since Donnellan introduced it in 1966, its precise nature is controversial. There are two main opposite approaches: Russellians (e.g. Neale and Bach) maintain that Russell’s analysis was basically correct and complete as semantic analysis, and that the aforementioned ambiguity is relevant only pragmatically (thus not affecting or discrediting Russell’s analysis). On the other hand, Referentialists (such as Wettstein and Devitt) maintain that the ambiguity suggested by Donnellan is a semantic one, and, consequently, that the analysis proposed by Russell is inadequate or incomplete. In this paper, I will examine Michael Devitt’s defence of Referentialist position based on his Argument from Convention, particularly with regard to the recent exchange between him and Kent Bach.

The Knowability Paradox from a Russelian Perspective

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In 1963 Frederic Fitch published Theorem 5, claiming that no truth is known as an unknown truth. It follows that if it is taken as true that there are unknown truths, the principle of knowability (KP), which claims all truths are knowable, must be rejected. If, on the other hand, the knowability principle is endorsed, then it must be denied that there are unknown truths and accepted that all truths are known (K). Many people analysed and discussed this puzzling result, but only Bernard Linsky (2006) tried to account for it by making use of the idea of logical types of propositions, in accord with a suggestion from Alonzo Church. I will go further in the same direction. To derive (K) from (KP), a bound propositional variable has to be replaced by “p¬Kp”, where “K” is the epistemic operator for knowledge. Such application makes an implicit use of the comprehension principle for propositions. Moreover (K) can appear paradoxical only if propositions are intensionally understood, for if all true propositions are to be identified, then all true propositions are known since a true proposition is known. Quantification of predicative variables is not involved. However, it might be taken as natural to transform “K” into a predicate and to allow such quantification. If this move is made, a standard paradox, similar to the Myhill-Russell paradox, can be derived. Its solution can be provided within the Russelian formal logic introduced by Church (1984) and discussed by Anderson (1989).
Russell’s Act-Object Model of Sensation and Its Relevance for Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Perception

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The relation of acquaintance plays an important role in Russell’s philosophical views. It is particularly significant in what has been left from his intended but never fully accomplished Theory of Knowledge (the 1913 Manuscript) – acquaintance is central to Russell’s search for the fundamental structure of human knowledge. Acquaintance is involved in any cognitive relation (belief, memory, imagination, sensation, etc.); I am interested in one of them: sensation, or perceptual experience, as it is called nowadays. The way Russell used the word “experience” is unfamiliar today; to those working on contemporary issues in the philosophy of perception, the word just means “perceptual experience”, whereas for Russell it had a much broader meaning. Yet nothing is lost as far as I am concerned, since perceptual experience, or what in Russell’s time was known as sensation, is a type of experience, according to the taxonomy of that time. My particular interest is in the act-object model of sensation that emerges from the Theory of Knowledge and in particular from Part I, Chapter III “Analysis of Experience”. Here Russell proposes an argument that experience has an act-object structure (what is experienced is different from the experiencing of it). In my paper, I analyze the argument, compare it with the argument to the same conclusion (i.e. sensation consists of two different entities: mental act and object) given by G.E. Moore, and draw certain conclusions about Russell’s argument. Some of them are directly relevant to contemporary debates in the philosophy of perception.

Russell’s Early Metaphysics of Truth, with some Applications

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In the Principles of Mathematics and related works, the notion of a proposition plays an important role; it is by analyzing propositions, showing what kinds of constituents they may have, that Russell arrives at his core logical concepts. At this time, his conception of proposition contains both a conventional and an unconven-
tional part. The former is the view that propositions are the ultimate truth-bearers; the latter is the view that the constituents of propositions are “worldly entities.” In the latter respect, Russellian propositions are akin to states-of-affairs on a robust understanding of these entities. This notion of a Russellian proposition is well-known, at least in outline. Not so well-known is his treatment of truth, which nevertheless grows directly out of this notion of proposition. For the early Russell, the import of truth is primarily metaphysical, rather than semantic; reversing the usual direction of explanation, he holds that being supervenes on truth. That is, what properties a thing has and what relations it bears to other things is determined, metaphysically speaking, by there being a suitable array of true and false propositions. In the present paper, this doctrine is examined for its content and motivation. To show that it plays an important role in Russell’s early metaphysics and logic, I explain its consequences for two important sets of issues. These are the problem of the unity of the proposition and the theory of denoting concepts.

Image as Datum and as Symbol in Russell’s 1921 Theory of Memory

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According to the theory Russell defends in The Analysis of Mind, “true memories” (memories that are not remembering-hows) are recollections of past events accompanied with a feeling of familiarity. While memory images play a vital role in this account, Russell does not pay much attention to the fact that the images fill different roles in different sorts of memories. In most cases that Russell considers, the memory is based on an image that serves as a datum (image-based memories), but there are other cases in which the memory judgment requires an image without being based on it (answer-memories). A good example of the former is when a person, asked what color was the sea in the afternoon, recalls an image and forms a judgment on this basis. In the second case she may recognize the sea and entertain a memory image of it, but she does not “read off” the memory judgment from this picture. Since in this latter case the feeling of familiarity is constitutive of the recollection but cannot serve as its explanans, answer-memories do not conform to Russell’s account. According to Lindsay Judson, this is not a vice of the theory, because Russell has never meant to extend it to answer-memories. Despite having a certain appeal of benevolence, however, Judson’s interpretation is not supported by textual evidence. Taking side with David Pears I will argue that Russell did not properly differentiate between image-based memory and answer-memory, and illegitimately extended his theory to the latter.
Matter and Mind in Russell’s Neutral Monism

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Although in Russell’s Neutral Monism there is only one kind of substance, i.e. events that are neither material nor mental, Russell speaks freely of matter and mind: The substance dualism from his Logical Atomism period is not given up altogether but is replaced by a “nomological dualism” serving similar purposes, especially for his epistemology. Analysis reveals that in his Neutral Monism phase, Russell distinguishes between three conceptions of matter and two conceptions of mind. Once these different conceptions are identified and closely examined, interesting results can be obtained about (a) the relation between his Logical Atomism and Neutral Monism and (b) the nature of Neutral Monism’s particulars and most fundamental ontological objects in general.

Do Genuinely Proper Names Carry an Ontological Commitment?

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The paper aims at drawing a comparison between Russell’s views on genuinely proper names and Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. The paper has four parts, following Russell’s analysis of genuinely proper names. In §1, I discuss Russell’s distinction between genuinely proper names and ordinary proper names and compare it to Kripke’s distinction between rigid and non-rigid designation. In §2, I discuss the way in which Russell identifies some of the genuinely proper names with those egocentric words taken as primitive in one’s vocabulary, and compare Russell and Quine’s notions of ostension. Quine’s advocacy of first-order logic forbids rigid designation, leading to a parallel analysis of the languages chosen by Russell and Quine. I reject the reproach that they use languages which might be called ontologically ideal, and investigate the role regimentation and paraphrase play in both ontological enterprises. In §3, I consider the difficulties encountered by the attempt to eliminate proper names (or individual constant) from one’s vo-
cabulary, and contrast Quine’s advocacy of such a reduction with Russell’s objections. I approach the cases of names without bearers and of unnamed objects, while envisaging substitution quantification and autonymy as possible means of making names matter for ontology. In §4, I sketch a reconstruction of Russell’s views on the relation between semantics and the other sciences, and subject Russell’s views to a Quinean critique. I also consider a view I term “semantic nihilism”, which I identify in some Quinean texts, and contrast it with a distinction between ontological reduction and conceptual reduction.

Russell’s Neutral Monism

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Neutral monism is a position which takes mental and physical phenomena to be real and reducible to the third, neutral level. Proponents of such neutralist solution to the mind-body problem must answer questions about the nature of neutral entities and about the relationship of these neutral entities to matter and to mind. In this paper I will discuss Russell’s neutral monism and the objection that it is an unstable position which leads either to the form of idealism or panpsychism, or to physicalism. I will compare Russell’s position to the contemporary attempts to find a place for the phenomenal properties in the natural world, e.g. Chalmers suggestion that protophenomenal properties constitute the neutral basis, and Stoljar’s physicalist proposal.

Referential Uncertainty of Proper Names – What Russell Tries to Say via “Socrates”

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In this paper, I open my discussion by investigating a question that Bertrand Russell raised nearly a century ago—the understanding of the name “Socrates”. In *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, Russell seems to have suggested that natural proper names like “Socrates” are in fact abbreviations of descriptions. The relevant paragraph has
been referred to again and again since then and Russell, it is assumed, believed that natural proper names are disguised descriptions. From my point of view what Russell was doing, via the example of “Socrates”, was to point out a very important issue relating to referential uncertainty, rather than giving a general account of the descriptive power of proper names. This issue draws my attention to the semantic role that the descriptive content of a proper name plays. The descriptive content of a name with an uncertain referent is crucial for the truth value of propositions in which this name is involved. The issue of referential uncertainty raises questions about some overstated claims that have been the bedrock of the Direct Reference Theory. For example, their definition of proper names, their understanding of referring and their view on referent identifying from the perspective of necessity. These views are what their criticism of descriptive theories of proper names is based upon.

The Butterfly Effect? The Reception of the Principles of Mathematics by the Pragmatist Philosophers

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Soon after its publication, Russell’s Principles of Mathematics was closely studied and commented upon by the pragmatist philosophers and logicians such as Charles Peirce, Christine Ladd-Franklin, Victoria Welby, F.C.S. Schiller, Philip Jourdain and Giovanni Vailati. The first to write the review was Peirce – only a paragraph in the Nation – in which he implied Russell to have misunderstood the algebraic logic of relatives and that Welby’s book, What is Meaning?, published in the same year, makes a preferred reading. Russell, who had quickly gotten hold of that review, was reportedly steamed and at once withdrew his earlier opinions concerning Peirce and his work. Consequently, the propagation of formal, uninterpreted logic took a more resolute course and the traces of the algebraic tradition vaned. Based on the correspondence and other unpublished material of the pragmatists, in particular Welby’s, Ladd-Franklin’s and Jourdain’s exchanges with Russell, my paper recounts the behind-the-scenes reception of the Principles by the pragmatist philosophers in the both sides of the ocean. In the light of this evidence, the pragmatists’ reaction against the soon-to-be-prevailing Russellian notion of logic – which for instance Ladd-Franklin continued well into the 1920s – becomes much more understandable.
According to Keith Donnellan, Russell’s views in *On Denoting* are applicable only to attributive uses of definite descriptions, and fail to take into account their referential uses. Part of Donnellan’s argument against Russell is grounded on the alleged possibility of referentially successful descriptions associated with an *unfitting* descriptive content: for instance, I may refer to a man with a glass of water by means of “the man with the Martini”. It is widely recognized that Donnellan’s case in favour of referential uses of descriptions is independent from his views on unfitting cases. Yet, it is generally taken for granted that, if Donnellan is right about these cases, he must also be right in his attack against Russell: if sentences involving “the man with the Martini” may truth-conditionally be anchored to a man with a glass of water, so the story goes, Russell’s attributive analysis must surely be unsuitable for them. The main aim of this essay is to strengthen the case in favour of Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions. In particular, I argue that, even if Donnellan is right about the Martini scenario, an acceptable solution is available, which is consistent with a Russellian analysis of attributive uses. My argument is grounded on *independently motivated* considerations about the choice of the context relevant for the evaluation of a given utterance, supported by the study of a variety of “context shifting” scenarios.

In the era of his no-class theory, Russell held that there are no functions in the modern sense and he admitted only individuals, propositions and propositional functions; these were classified by means of his ramified theory of types. This proposal was criticized in length and many adopted the opinion of Ramsey and Quine that there are only individuals, functions and expressions which were (allegedly wrongly) assumed by Russell as intensional entities. Yet Russell’s variables are genuine ob-
The objects (represented in language by “signs”), Russell did not subscribe to modern paradigm that variables are letters. Consequently, propositional functions cannot be expressions, since expressions cannot contain such variables-letters. I propose to view Russell’s propositional functions as Pavel Tichý’s constructions, expressions-independent structured procedures (generalized algorithms; for their huge defense, see Tichý 1988). Now all Russell’s key ideas acquire a very good sense: vicious circle principle is entirely natural and ramified theory of types becomes its inevitable consequence. However, Tichý’s RTT does contain also ordinary functions, thus we have another point for the interpretation of Russell’s thoughts. The author suggests also two formulations of the Axiom of reducibility (which is a correct principle), only one of which was somehow formalized by Russell; the other formulation — covering the notion of impredicativity — was illegal in Russell’s system but I suggest a modification of (Tichý’s) RTT in order to legalize it. Hence, when propositional functions are viewed as Tichý’s constructions, Russell’s utmost contribution to the philosophy of logic is of a high plausibility.

**Singular Terms and the Gray’s Elegy Argument**

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It is widely accepted that the “Gray’s Elegy Argument” (GEA) targets the theory of denoting concepts which Russell had set out in *The Principles of Mathematics* (PoM). In a recent interpretation of the argument, Nathan Salmon (2005) has suggested that the GEA attempts to demonstrate the falsity of the thesis that definite descriptions are singular terms, a view which he attributes to Russell in PoM. I argue in this paper that the Russell of PoM was not committed to the thesis in question and that therefore, in this respect, Salmon has mischaracterised the purport of both the GEA and, ultimately, of *On Denoting* (OD) itself. Through introducing a set of “principles of semantic failure” it is demonstrated that Russell’s conception of singular terms involved standards which, even in PoM, he found that definite descriptions did not meet. Then, through considering a comparison between, on the one hand, object-dependent and object-independent truth-conditions, and, on the other hand, singular and quantificational propositions, it is demonstrated that in PoM Russell took definite descriptions to be restricted quantifier expressions (rather than singular terms). In this way I argue against Salmon’s claim (p. 1076) that “Russell’s ultimate aim in [OD] is to supplant the view that a definite description is a singular term”, and demonstrate a good deal more continuity between PoM and OD than is generally acknowledged.
Quantification Dependence and Kantian Intuition in Russell’s
Principles of Mathematics

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Russell’s criticism of Kant has had an enormous influence on the subsequent study of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. Though largely responsible for the long pervasive disrepute in which Kant’s views on mathematics were held, Russell’s analysis is also the primary source of what has become a dominant school of interpretation of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics – the so-called Logical Interpretation. A neglected benefit of the extensive work carried in the framework of the Logical Interpretation lies in its elaborating the implications of Russell’s original insights. Even interpreters who reject every premise of Russell’s conception of Kant’s do not question this: that Russell’s views of the inadequacy of Kant’s incursion of intuition into his philosophy of mathematics have sources in (classical) logic’s genesis with the discovery of nested polyadic quantification. Thus Russell holds that the resources of modern polyadic quantification theory are adequate for addressing what Kant perceived correctly to be inadequate logical resources available to his 18th Century self. But, as is well known, the most elaborate statement of Russell’s diagnosis of the role of intuition in Kant’s philosophy of mathematics is 1903 Principles of Mathematics. In this paper I explore the influence on Russell’s understanding of intuition in Kant of Russell’s own limitations of logical and conceptual resources for rigorous representation and understanding of nested polyadic quantification in the context of his doctrine of denoting concepts and formal implication of 1903, and through the transition from Principles’ doctrine of denoting concepts to 1905’s On Denoting.

The Early Reception of Russell’s Ramified Type Theory

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There has been a significant shift in Russell’s conception of logic, i.e. his ramified theory of types (RTT), from the first the second edition of Principia Mathematica. Among other things, his 1925 logic is characterized by the dropping of the axiom
of reducibility and the introduction of an axiom of extensionality which induces a shift from the “no-class theory” expressed in *20 of the first edition to what can in fact be called a predicative set theory allowing different orders of classes (Linski 2004). A similar predicative theory without reducibility has already been proposed in 1924 in an early comment on Principia, namely Chwistek’s “constructive theory of types”. My aim in this talk is to draw attention to certain interpretive issues related to this shift and its reception: I first discuss some subtle differences between Russell’s RTT anno 1925 and Chwistek’s position and see how they differ in their capacity to reconstruct classical mathematics. Here the focus will be on the implicit semantics of the two approaches and on resulting difficulties related to the development of mathematical induction over natural numbers (compare Landini 1996). Secondly, a number of reflections of a more philosophical nature by Ramsey (1925) and Carnap (1931) on Russell’s conception of predicativity codified in RTT will be discussed. I will argue that despite the fact that the both authors suggest a substantial modification of Russell’s logic towards a simple theory of types allowing unrestricted impredicative comprehension, they present insightful and diverging remarks on the status of predicativity conditions in logic that reveal an underlying philosophical debate on the limits of constructivism and the true nature of quantification virulent in the 1920s.

Leibniz and Russell: Begriffsschrift

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There is a historic line of thinking about a specific language of logic, closely connected with the development of contemporary logic and philosophy of language. It starts with Leibniz’ project of contemporary logic and philosophy of language. It starts with Leibniz’ project of characteristica universalis and finds a realisation in Frege’s conception of written language of logic – Begriffsschrift or conceptual notation. Leibniz was the only traditional philosopher Frege actually mentioned when elucidating the goal and possible applications of his own logical project in Begriffsschrift. Russell made his own modifications of Frege’s language, the two most prominent being the treatment of definite descriptions, and, second, the theory of logical types. This line of thinking about a language of logic as a logically perfect language found its radical shape in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, and finally broke down in Philosophical Investigations. Here we discuss some main points of Russell’s view of language of logic and its relation to natural language(s). Some difficulties and ambiguities concerning Russell’s view on real purpose and charac-
ter of language of logic are closely connected with more general problems in his conception of philosophical analysis, and some of them seem to be present in the whole tradition, from Leibniz, via Frege, up to Wittgenstein.

The Slingshot and Russell’s Descriptions

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The slingshot argument is a reductio purporting to show that if there are facts at all there is only one to which all true statements correspond. If facts are not non-trivially individuable then this presumably must render the notion of fact (and, by implication, theories such as the correspondence theory of truth) incoherent. Church and Davidson (among others) deployed the slingshot in exoneration of the Fregean conclusion that favours a uni-referent — the so-called “True” — for true statements. The slingshot relies crucially on treating definite descriptions as singular, referring terms, a treatment that is rendered unnecessary on Russell’s theory of descriptions. If this is so, friends of facts such as Russell can rest content. I, however, argue against the thesis that Russell’s theory so succeeds and develop what Gödel could have meant when, in thinking about this application of Russellian semantics, was prompted to write (“Russell’s Mathematical Logic”, 1944): “I cannot help feeling that the problem raised by Frege’s puzzling conclusion has only been evaded by Russell’s theory of descriptions and that there is something behind it which is not yet completely understood.”
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